In big data systems, the infrastructure is such that large amounts of data are hosted away from the users. In such a system information security is considered as a major challenge. From a customer perspective, one of the big risks in adopting big data systems is in trusting the provider who designs and owns the infrastructure from accessing user data. Yet there does not exist much in the literature on detection of insider attacks. In this work, we propose a new system architecture in which insider attacks can be detected by utilizing the replication of data on various nodes in the system. The proposed system uses a two-step attack detection algorithm and a secure communication protocol to analyze processes executing in the system. The first step involves the construction of control instruction sequences for each process in the system. The second step involves the matching of these instruction sequences among the replica nodes. Initial experiments on real-world hadoop and spark tests show that the proposed system needs to consider only 20 percent of the code to analyze a program and incurs 3.28 percent time overhead. The proposed security system can be implemented and built for any big data system due to its extrinsic workflow.
INTRODUCTION
B IG data solutions are widely adopted across various government and enterprise domains such as software, finance, retail and health care. They are pioneering in the field of advanced data analytics and have a projected market of approximately 50 billion dollars by 2018. The most frequent use-cases of big data are information retrieval from complex, unstructured data; and real time data analysis [1] . But along with its rapid market growth, the big data trend also has its share of challenges and risks. In an era where extracting information from data is sanctioned to all, users are understandably more skeptical to let service providers host their data away from them. This, along with the recent increase in the number of cyber-attacks elevates the importance for security in big data. Though privacy and security are touted to be important problems in the big data world, the solutions concentrate only on leveraging big data systems for efficient security in other domains.
According to OpenSOC, in 60 percent of breaches data gets stolen within hours of the breach and 54 percent of breaches are not discovered for months [9] . This is unacceptable in the big data world where the revenue is based on efficient management of user data. Recently, two unauthorized backdoors were discovered in Juniper Networks firewalls that might have given attackers access to highly classified information. Some important facts about this particular hack are: (a) it comes at the cost of compromising national security (b) it shows that even a major network security company is vulnerable to attacks (c) it is believed that these backdoors were left undiscovered for almost 3 years; and (d) it was reported that the attackers could have deleted the security logs [8] . To fight the evolving scope of attacks and attackers, it is important to apply traditional security methods in new combinations. Security in popular big data systems such as Hadoop [4] and Spark [5] is provided with authentication through Kerberos [6] , access control lists (ACL), log monitoring and data encryption (to some extent). But for an insider, especially a traitor, circumventing these mechanisms is not difficult [7] .
Traditional security methods are necessary but not sufficient for big data systems. Big data security has some unique challenges concerning both applications and data. For instance, current big data security platforms focus on providing fine-grained security through extensive analysis of stored data. But such models indirectly facilitate the abuse of user data in the hands of applications and service provider. This led to the rise of differential privacy that aims at protecting sensitive user information while supporting data analytics. Another such security concern that has been seldom addressed in the big data world is insider attacks. Insider attacks are becoming more common and are considered the toughest attacks to detect [2] . There does not exist much in the literature on solutions for insider attacks in general [3] . Existing insider detection techniques concentrate on user profiling and access control. For these methods to be applicable in the big data world, it is assumed that collusion is a rare event. Though the assumption holds true in most cases, the real drawback with existing insider detection techniques is their inability to be applied in distributed compute environments. To the best of our knowledge, there is no robust solution for detecting or preventing insider threats within big data infrastructures. But it is crucial to address the problem of insider attacks in big data systems for three main reasons: (a) traitor within the provider's organization will be able to circumvent the security system in place (b) sensitivity of customer information stored in the system is increasing by day; and (c) there is no consensus or widespread agreement on well-defined security standards in the big data community.
To address the insider attack problem in big data, security solutions should be designed to exploit underlying system properties and be delegated to resources that are not contributing to the efficiency of the system. The main features of big data infrastructures are fast data processing, high scalability, high availability and fault-tolerance. Availability and fault-tolerance of big data systems comes from intelligent replication of data. This implies SIMD style, parallel execution of the same program at multiple locations. When a program is scheduled for execution on the big data cluster, it runs as an individual process on every data node that hosts a copy of the program data. The replication of data on various nodes in the big data system can be utilized in providing security. Given the isolation that can be achieved with hardware level security, delegating security to special purpose hardware such as TPM [10] and TXT [11] chips is worth considering. Such an infrastructure will have the advantages of (a) understanding the system to be protected (b) performing security analysis remotely (c) reducing the overhead on main processor by delegating security, and (d) significantly decreasing the cost of data transfer while providing efficient security techniques.
In this paper, we submit an extended version of system architecture for insider attack detection in big data systems that was proposed in [7] . In this work, we propose representing a program by a fixed-length hash of control instruction sequence (CIS) instead of its attack probability score (APS) calculated using rule engines and data structures as given in [7] . This move from a probability-based metric to a hash makes the security technique verifiable and fast. Similar to the previous work, our proposed system here uses a two step algorithm for attack detection. First, program profiling is performed by individual nodes of the big data cluster on the processes they execute. Here, process binaries of scheduled processes are disassembled and analyzed to generate CIS. These sequences are then hashed, encrypted and shared among data nodes that host the same data i.e., primary and replica nodes. Next, consensus among data nodes is achieved regarding the possibility of a process being attacked. This step involves two phases: hash matching and information sharing. Upon receiving encrypted messages from primary nodes, the replica nodes apply sequential, ondemand string matching between the locally generated hash and the received hash. Next, the result of this comparison is shared with the primary node. Depending on the results received, the primary data node notifies the master node to take necessary recovery measures. All communications among data nodes are performed using a secure communication protocol that is based on public-private key encryption. The main contributions of this work are as follows:
1) The idea of having security as an independent module in big data systems by designing a system architecture for detecting insider attacks in big data systems.
2) A novel extrinsic work-flow for security in big data systems using control instruction sequences (CIS), hash matching and encrypted communication.
3) A one-shot program profiling technique that builds
instruction-level CIS from the native code of scheduled processes. 4) Extensive testing of proposed security framework on big data examples from Hadoop MapReduce and Spark MLlib to show the low overhead of 3.28 percent. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a primer on insider attacks in general purpose computing. This section also discusses the current security methods in big data and some related works. Section 3 describes our attack model. The proposed system which includes the two step attack detection algorithm and the secure communication protocol are explained in Section 4. A model for the proposed system with a list of required components is also given in this section. Section 5 shows the impact and usefulness of the proposed security system architecture by conducting realworld experiments on Hadoop and Spark clusters. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusion and outlines future work.
BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
This section gives a primer on insider attacks and their solutions in general purpose computing and discusses the current security mechanisms available in the big data world. Also, the various related works are briefly described here.
Insider Attacks: A Primer
Though security in general computing has been extensively studied and implemented over the years, computers are still vulnerable to attacks. Software based attacks that typically target a computer network or system, called cyber-attacks, are growing in their frequency and impact. The plot for any type of software attack involves exploitation of a piece of code that runs on a computer. It is inherent to this perspective about a cyber-attack that security can be provided at two levels: (a) by the software that is used to compile and execute the program; and (b) by the hardware that runs the program. Providing security at software level gives more context and information about the target programs that are being protected. But this comes with the risk of the security software itself being compromised. On the other hand, having security at hardware level gives more isolation to the process of analyzing and securing programs though it becomes difficult to give detailed context about the programs and the infrastructures running them. In any case, the toughest software attacks to counter are the ones whose genesis is intentional and are performed by those who have a good understanding of the underlying system.
Based on our literature review, we have identified four major questions that can guide towards better handling of insider attacks: (a) who can perform these attacks? (b) what gets affected? (c) how to detect these attacks? and (d) how to prevent them from happening? Fig. 1 gives a list of entities to consider when dealing with insider attacks. The figure also shows the four questions, from above, as relationships among the entities. Insider attacks can be performed by (a) traitors who are legally a part of the system but want to misuse the access privileges given to them; (b) masqueraders who get access to the system by stealing identities of those who have legitimate access. Insider attacks can affect the proper functionality of a program or corrupt the data used by the programs. Profiling and trapping are two most common ways to detect insider attacks [3] , [12] . Profiling can be performed (a) at the program level [13] and at the user level [14] . Traps can be set in the programs or in the network to force the attacker into performing certain actions that help towards exposing the attack [15] . The biggest concern with these insider attack detection methods is the possibility of losing valuable data. Hence, insider attack prevention mechanisms such as identity management [16] , [17] , access control lists [6] , [18] , data encryption [19] , [20] etc must be employed at the same time.
Insider Attacks in Big Data Systems
Insider attacks are a dangerous security problem in any domain because they are difficult to predict and detect [12] . Hence organizations must try to safe guard their systems and data from insider attacks [29] . Predictive models for user/program/network behavior with the help of continuous monitoring is a widely adopted solution for insider attack detection. But such prediction is not completely reliable and the difficulty in detecting attacks grows with the complexity of the underlying system. Recent advancements in computing led to wide adoption of services such as cloud computing and big data which are extremely complex in their design and development. In cloud computing, many insider attacks can be performed by misleading the client side services and once compromised, data obtained can provide social engineering opportunities for cascade attacks [30] . Having security as a service model for cloud environments [31] and having sealed clouds [32] are some ideas proposed towards protecting cloud infrastructures from insider attacks. While cloud computing is more about computing on the fly, big data deals with organizing and managing large sets of data. Insider attack detection and prevention for big data frameworks is an area that is not well explored yet.
Security within big data systems is still a budding phenomenon. It is ideal to include security as a major component in the holistic view of big data systems. But the requirements of big data applications such as real-time data processing, fault tolerance and continuous availability give little scope to employ complex and robust security mechanisms. According to Hadoop Security Design [34] , permissible performance overhead for a change in architecture is only 3 percent. Hence powerful security mechanisms such as data encryption are optional and restricted in big data systems. Data encryption in hadoop is only available for data that gets exchanged between user and the system but not for data that travels within the system. Randomized data encryption for data security was proposed in [37] but this work acknowledges that faster results are yet to be achieved.
Big data properties such as large scale distributed infrastructures and replication make it difficult to detect insider attacks precisely using the traditional methods. In this work, we demonstrate the inefficiency of existing big data security mechanisms by implementing two insider attacks on a big data cluster. Fig. 2 shows two workflows we used to successfully implement an insider attack in a hadoop big data cluster. This paper only discusses the workflow of the attacks but a detailed report on the results of these attacks can be found in our previous work [7] .
Manipulating Activity Logs
The first attack, as shown in Fig. 2a , manipulates log data in order to produce erroneous results during log analysis. To demonstrate this attack we use a Hortonworks tutorial [38] about system admins detecting distributed DOS attacks on the hadoop cluster by analyzing the server log data. We use this workflow as a counterexample to show that a system admin can act as a traitor, manipulate the server log data and create results that depict a wrong picture to the higher administration. As per the workflow in this example, users requests the client service to access data stored in HDFS. These user requests will all be logged by the log4j service. Hence, any attackers requests from outside will also be logged. The system admin can build a framework with the help of services such as Flume, Hive and Hcatalog to monitor and track the user requests. But they can also introduce a small script in this workflow that filters the streaming data going from Flume to Hive and manipulate the results according to the insider's choice.
Deleting Edit Log
The second attack, as shown in Fig. 2b , deletes the contents of editlog such that user data gets deleted eventually. A system admin who has access to the secondary namenode in a hadoop cluster can implement this attack. Namenode is the focal point (and a single point of failure) of a HDFS file system. It stores the metadata of all files in HDFS along with their storage locations in a data blob called the fsImage. Editlogs, along with fsImage, are updated periodically such that the namenode has access to up to date information about data stored in the hadoop cluster. To save time and computation energy on the namenode, this process is performed off-site on secondary namenode, sometimes called the checkpoint node and the output fsImage is directly dumped on to the namenode. Hence, manipulating edit log content will reflect, by the next checkpoint, on the fsImage which will be used by the namenode for job allocation and scheduling. This is a weak point in the hadoop architecture that can be misused easily by insiders. In this work, we attempt to mitigate insider attacks in big data systems by profiling big data applications and verifying consistency in their behavior. Verifying program behavior by analyzing its control-flow is a popular technique. In this work, we are more interested in Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [21] , [22] that enforces the execution of a program to follow a path that belongs to the program's control flow graph. The set of possible paths are determined ahead of time using static CFG [21] , [22] . A coarse-grained or finegrained version of CFI can be used for program profiling. But the problem with any such profiling techniques is the overhead incurred in conducting them, even more if performed remotely. Though such limitations of this approach have been identified [23] , it is accepted as a strong and stable security enforcing mechanism. There are a plethora of CFG-based code similarity algorithms [24] . But such CFG similarity check methods are complex, expensive, have no defined standards. Most CFG similarity algorithms rely on some simplification techniques such as fingerprints, edit distance, comparison only with known graphs in a database etc. Also, the impact of CFG similarity analysis differs a lot depending on when and how the CFG is generated for a program. These complexities and uncertainties led to a new set of control flow analysis techniques that avoid translating the program code to a formal model. For example, insider attack detection based on symbolic execution and modelchecking of assembly code was proposed in [25] .
Symbolic execution is a software testing technique for code coverage. It generates high code coverage tests for closed source binaries by executing programs on all possible inputs at once and is used to find vulnerabilities in arbitrary binary applications. But the solver needs to know all symbolic variables and states upfront which leads to state space explosion problem [28] . The variable values are initialized with random values to reduce the scope of large search space of all possible inputs. This makes symbolic execution a powerful tool for vulnerability analysis only for small programs with limited number of symbolic variables [26] . Also, distributed implementations of symbolic execution [27] that are needed in big data context are premature and open new attack vectors. The proposed approach is much simpler than such SMT solvers because it performs exact matching on fixed-length strings and the inputs are instruction sequences obtained from simple traversal of assembly code. This is a novel approach for control flow similarity check that can be used in attack detection because it discards the idea of building CFGs or exploring all symbolic paths.
Finally, in this work we also propose the delegation of security in big data systems by designing an independent system with the necessary components. A TPM based authentication protocol for hadoop was proposed by [39] which claims to be much faster than Kerberos, though it has not been fully implemented. A hardware oriented security method to create trusted Apache Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) was proposed in [40] which is a theoretically novel concept but was proven to work only on one node.
ATTACK MODEL
Our attack model focuses on misuse of program information by system admins of a big data platform. Security features such as data confidentiality and operational guarantees such as correctness of results can be compromised because of such misuse. The goals of an insider conducting such attacks can vary from personal vendetta to financial gain. The proposed system targets such specific insider attacks because they are easy to implement with existing security solutions on platforms such as Hadoop and Spark. Attacks targeting misuse of program information can be performed by creating malicious programs or by modifying of existing program binaries with malicious intent. Given the existing security features of user-level activity monitoring, we exclude the possibility of system admins writing and executing new malicious programs from the scope of our attack model. Instead, our attack model focuses on system admins being able to modify binaries of existing programs that are cleared to run on the big data cluster. Our goal is to spot control-flow vulnerabilities in the code of such programs that can be exploited by insiders. We acknowledge that insider attacks are too broad and not all of them can be mitigated by the proposed solution. There can be other insider attacks possible to carry out in a big data environment that are not visible at compile time and the proposed system may or may not be able to detect. Some assumptions made by this attack model are:
A system admin will manage only software resources and has no physical access to the hardware hosting that software. Replicas are distributed globally.
A system admin has access to only one of the many replicas.
Collusion is not possible. An intermediate representation of programs (bytecode) can be obtained from the compiled binary. This includes, but not limited to, programs written in Java, Scala and Python.
PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section we explain the proposed system in detail. Fig. 3 shows the proposed system that includes a secure communication protocol and a two step attack detection algorithm. The first step in the attack detection algorithm is process profiling, which is conducted locally and independently at each node to identify possible attacks. In the next step is hash matching and consensus, which is conducted by replica data nodes to conclude about the authenticity of a possible attack.
Secure Communication Protocol
A big data system is technically a distributed data storage system that relies on secure and efficient communication protocols for data transfer. The proposed system aims to provide robust security for big data systems by having a modular design and being independent from the core big data services. For this reason, a separate secure communication protocol is included in the proposed system design that can be isolated from the set of default communication protocols used by the big data system. The proposed system is a mix of independent security modules that work together and reside on individual nodes of the system. These modules use the secure communication protocol to share packets of data with their counterparts on other nodes of the cluster. The data shared among the security modules in our system architecture contain vital information about the analysis of a process. Hence, we propose using a public key cryptosystem in our secure communication protocol. All data transferred by any node using this secure communication channel is encrypted upfront using private key encryption and hardcoded keys that are not accessible to anyone. The associated public key will be shared with all other replica nodes that a data node need to communicate with. Hardware security chips such as TPM [10] or Intel's TXT [11] have public-private key encryption modules. Such hardware security chips come with a hardcoded, on-chip master key. A simple random number generator module is used to generate public-private key pairs periodically using the hardwired master key. For this work, we relied on SSH protocol for secure communication using RSA for key exchange but any such cryptosystem will work. Given the off chance of leakage of private keys, a key pair is held active for only a certain time period T . This increases the robustness of the communication protocol. In this work, we did not focus on finding the perfect value for T but assumed it to be a predefined value of 1 second. The public key of a node is shared with all other nodes it has to communicate with i.e., replica nodes and master node. All incoming data packets to a node will be encrypted with its current public key and can only be decrypted using the corresponding private key that is stored locally. Decrypted information will be sent to the process matching module to identify attacks.
Given the short lifespan of public keys used in our secure communication protocol, each node should be able to store public keys of all other nodes it has to communicate with. Also, storing older keys of other nodes helps in verifying authenticity of nodes in case of attack recovery. Hence, we propose to use queue data structures on every node to store the periodically generated public keys of other nodes. Back of queue n will be the latest public key to be used for encrypting packets to be sent to node n while front of queue n will be deleted when queue n is full (to accommodate a new key). Limiting the maximum queue size by some k will make sure that a node has enough information to support attack recovery measures while not consuming too much memory. Again, we did not focus on finding the perfect value for k but used a predefined value of 3 while conducting our experiments.
Algorithm 1 shows the steps involved in the proposed secure communication protocol. Once a model of the proposed system is installed, all nodes will periodically generate public-private key pairs for as long as the system is in use. This is accomplished with the help of the hardwired key on the special purpose security chip and the random number generator module. At the end of every T time units, a new public-private key (newkp n ) is generated on a node for communicating with replica node n. The private key priv n of newkp n will be used for decrypting incoming data from node n and the public key pub n of newkp n will be shared with node n. For ease of access to keys during decryption, current private keys of all nodes are stored in an array arr priv ½. Once a public key pub n is shared with node n, all incoming messages from node n will only be decrypted using the associated priv n for the next T time units. An array of queues, arr pub ½, is used to store public keys received from all other nodes. When a node has to send an message msg to replica nodes, the public key of that node is used to create an encrypted message msg e . Algorithm 1. Secure Communication Protocol while true do if time ¼ T then for all n 2 OtherNodes do newkp n get new public private key pair (TPM) pub n get public key from newkp n priv n get private key from newkp n node n sendðpub n Þ arr priv ½n priv n end for for all n 2 OtherNodes do if queue n full then dequeueðqueue n Þ end if queue n enqueueðpub n Þ arr pub ½n queue n end for end if end while msg to be sent to all replicas for all r 2 Replicas do pub r backðarr pub ½nÞ msg e encryptðmsg; pub r Þ sendðmsg e Þ end for
Detection Algorithm
The main part of the proposed system is the attack detection algorithm which will be explained in this subsection. Our attack detection algorithm is a two step process: process profiling (step 1) and consensus through hash matching (step 2).
Step 1: Process Profiling
Traditionally vulnerability scanning is performed away from the source program's execution domain to guarantee isolation. Hence, the results of such scan must be communicated back to the program. But this leads to a cost versus isolation trade-off, depending on the remoteness of the location used to perform the vulnerability scan. In big data applications, the source program's execution is distributed across multiple nodes of the cluster. This makes it difficult to implement techniques such as vulnerability scans on big data systems. But big data infrastructures use replication of data for high availability. This enforces the same program to be run on multiple nodes that host the data required for the program. We exploit this unique property of big data systems and introduce a variation of CFI to create a novel process profiling technique that can help in detecting insider attacks in big data systems. Evans et al. [23] show that CFI, either with limited number of tags or unlimited number of tags, is not completely effective in attack prevention. Also, CFI is usually based on CFG created from static analysis of program code.
When applications use multiple libraries they do not convey much about the control structure they represent. So static analysis from source code does not provide complete coverage in case of big data applications. But intermediate representations of application code can be obtained in the from their compiled binaries. If the applications are executed in a virtual machine environment, then the intermediate representation will be using instruction set specific to the virtual environment. For example, big data applications packaged as jars to run on Java Virtual Machines (JVM) can have an intermediate representation in bytecode. In this work, we propose to build the control structure of a program from its intermediate representation. In case of Java applications it would be JVM output i.e., the assembly code of the Hotspot VM that hosts the JVM. In case of Python applications it would still be JVM output if Jython is used or the intermediate representation would be assembly code using instruction set of the underlying CPU architecture if traditional python interpreters like CPython or PyPy are used to compile the applications. The idea is to use the final run-time code that gets executed on the hardware to generate the control instruction sequences. The control structure generated from the intermediate representations such as output of Hotspot VM or output of Cpython and PyPy is expected to be less susceptible to software attacks compared to a CFG generated from statistical analysis of program code. In the context of big data platforms, this mitigates the possibility of launching an attack on the entire cluster. Another major variation from CFI in our process profiling technique is to use individual control flow instruction sequences instead of CFG paths. Control instructions dictate the control flow in a program. Generating instruction sequences of such control flow instructions from the assembly code output of hotspot VM should technically give us all information a CFG can provide in this context and avoid the complexity involved in generating a CFG.
Step 2: Hash Matching and Consensus
The analyzer module in the proposed system creates instruction sequences for jumps, calls and returns from the intermediate representation of a given program. Then, the SHA cryptographic hash function module is used to generate a fixed-length output for each of the three instruction sequences. All three hashes are combined and again given to the SHA cryptographic hash function module to generate a final hash for the program. This hash of hashes strengthens the uniqueness in identifying a program. All programs that run on every node in the cluster will follow the same routine. Encryption module of the node with the primary copy of data uses currently active public keys of replica nodes to encrypt the hash of hashes and send it to the associated replica node. Hence, this node acts as the coordinator for performing step 2 in the attack detection algorithm.
Algorithm 2 shows the steps involved in the proposed process profiling step. This algorithm will be running independently in the analyzer module of all machines in the big data cluster. Every process output, proc new is grabbed by the analyzer module of the proposed system and profiled based on the control flow instructions present in its assembly code. Line by line analysis of proc new is conducted and each instruction instr is matched with the set of control flow instructions available in the instruction set of the processor architecture. For this work, we used only the most prominent control flow instructions of Intel's x86 architecture i.e., jumps, calls and returns. When an instr in the code of the proc new is a control flow instruction, it gets added to the corresponding sequence string. The seq array represents the array of individual control flow instruction sequences in the process proc new . This array is used later as input while generating the hashes for each control sequence string. All fixed length hash outputs are combined as hash hashes and rehashed to generate a final hash called msg that represents the program. This msg is then shared with all replicas running the same program using the secure communication protocol described above. The second step in our attack detection algorithm is a consensus algorithm similar to the extended 2-phase commit protocol [41] . In this step, the node with primary copy of data acts as coordinator and requests all replica nodes, that act as workers, to confirm if their local hash of hashes, (msg) of a particular process matches exactly with the coordinator's version. The coordinator then decides on the safety of the process depending on the acknowledgments received from participating replica nodes. A process is considered to be safe by the coordinator if and only if it receives safe acknowledgments from all of the workers. At the end of process profiling step, encrypted message msg e is shared by coordinator node with all worker nodes. The nodes that receive such messages will decrypt the message with their currently active private key. The decrypted message is essentially the hash of hashes of the three control instruction sequence strings. This decrypted hash of hashes can be directly compared to the local version of the same process to detect the possibility of an attack. If the result of such comparison of strings is a perfect match, then that indicates that the same process (with the same code) was run on both nodes. This indicates a safe process unless both nodes of the cluster are attacked the same way, in which case it will be a false negative. A confirmation message about the result of the hash comparison will be sent to the coordinator node as response to the original incoming message. The coordinator node will wait to receive responses from all replicas in order to arrive at a conclusion about the possibility of an attack in a process. The given big data system is safe as long as all the replicas respond with a safe confirmation. A single unsafe response will mean that the system is under attack. Algorithms 3 and 4 give more details about the hash matching and consensus steps that take place in step 2 of the attack detection algorithm. A pictorial representation of the steps involved in our 2-step attack detection algorithm is given in Fig. 4 . This figure represents a big data system with a replication factor of 3 and hence there is one coordinator (represented with a dark black shadow below the node) and two workers. Active communication channels are represented using a dotted line while the regular lines between nodes represent passive communication channel. The blue dotted loop around each node in step 1 and 3 of the figure represent local computations. Algorithm 3 is used in the hash matching step of the attack detection algorithm. When a worker node, node k receives msg p from the coordinator node about a process p, it will decrypt that message using its current private key, priv k and stores the result as hash hashes ðreceived p Þ. The local version of the same string i.e., hash hashes ðlocal p Þ will be compared against the hash hashes ðreceived p Þ to identify similarity between local and received hash of a process. The result of this hash matching is sent back as confirmation to the coordinator node, main. The value of confirmation is safe in case of a perfect match of hashes and unsafe otherwise. Algorithm 4 is used by the coordinator node to identify an attack, with the help of worker nodes. After step 1, the coordinator node waits for responses from all the recipients. The worker nodes respond with a confirmation message that says whether the process is safe or unsafe. If the count of number of safe responses i.e., count safe from worker nodes matches with the count of number of nodes in the replica set i.e., count replicas , the coordinator node assumes that there is no attack in the current process p and resets the attack variable. Else, if a mismatch in the process analysis is observed, the attack variable is set and the master node is notified about the possibility of an attack in process p.
Model of the Proposed System Architecture
The proposed security system is a combination of 3 parts: secure communication protocol, process profiling and hash matching. As shown in Fig. 3 , these three parts are made of multiple modules that need to be installed on all nodes in the big data system. Also, locality of these modules impacts the performance of the system greatly. The closer they are to the main processor of a node, the faster and less expensive it will be to communicate. But from a security standpoint, these modules need to be isolated from the big data system main workflow. Hence we designed a model for the proposed system that can fit on isolated special purpose security hardware chips. Such chips can be built on top of existing security hardware such as TPM or Intel's TXT chips [10] , [11] . Hardware solutions are popularly known to affect the scalability and flexibility of the big data infrastructure, comparing to a software solution which can be very adaptive. But in this case, we avoid such problems by decoupling our solution from the workflow of a big data platform. There will be a one-time extra cost due to the hardware security modules. An overview of the elements in such a model of the proposed system is given in Fig. 5 . The functionality of each of these elements is as follows:
Analyzer, this module will get the data in the form of bytecode or assembly code and perform some basic cleaning. Result from analyzer is stored in Memory. CFI filter, this module takes input, a set of assembly language instructions, from the Analyzer module (technically, the Memory module) and filters out the control flow instructions, while maintaining the order. Sequencers, there are three sequencers in our model, one each for jumps, calls and returns. Each sequencer goes through the output of CFI filter module and forms a delimited sequence string of the instruction it is associated with. Then, the sequencer uses the SHA hasher module to generate and store a fixed length hash output from the variable length instruction sequence string. Register Array, there are 4 registers in this array to store message, jump instruction hash, call instruction hash and return instruction hash. Message Register, this is a special register in the Register Array used to store the message in thread-safe manner. Message Generator, this module combines all the individual hash outputs stored in registers and uses the SHA hasher module to generate a fixed length hash output. This hash of hashes is combined with the process metadata to generate and store a message that represents the process. Encryptor/Decryptor, this module uses the Key Store to access the current set of public/private keys and the Message Register to access the current process message. The Encryptor module uses the public key of a replica node from the Key Store and encrypts the message in Message Register. The decryptor module uses the private key of the node from the Key Store to decrypt an incoming message. Comparator, this module performs string comparison between local message (hash of hashes) and received message. Key Generator, this module uses the underlying TPM/TXT chip's [10] , [11] in-built functionality. The hardwired key and the random number generator of the security chip are used to generate a new public/ private key pair; and the timer of the chip to trigger this action periodically. Key Store, this module uses an array of memory locations to store the public key queues of all replica nodes and the current public / private key pair of this node. The three most recent public keys of each replica node is stored in its queue. Exchanger, this module uses TCP/IP protocol to exchange messages with other nodes.
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we describe the experimental setup, explain in detail about our choice of experiments and analyze the results. The hadoop security design specifies that a 3 percent slowdown in performance is permissible for any newly proposed security solutions [34] . Hence, it is important for the proposed system to offer both theoretical correctness and feasibility in practical implementation and usage. Security in big data systems is a new area that does not have set standards and specifically designed open-source benchmarks to evaluate the overhead. Hence, we had to handpick a set of general big data benchmark programs that are relevant and provided by the big data community to test the efficiency of our proposed security system.
Setup
The three big data services used for our experiments are:
Hadoop [4] , the most popular implementation of a big data framework that is maintained by the Apache open-source community. It allows storing and processing of large date using programming models such as MapReduce. Spark [5] , a fast and general engine for large-scale data processing that is supposedly much faster than Hadoop and it is maintained by the Apache opensource community as well. Amazon Web Services (AWS) [42] , [43] , [44] , a perfect example of real-world big data system. AWS provides Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) service that allows users to use Amazon cloud's compute capacity depending on their needs. EC2 presents a true virtual computing environment. Storage for the EC2 nodes is provided by Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) which offers persistent storage. EBS volumes are automatically replicated to protect user from component failure, offering high availability and durability. A 5 node Hadoop AWS cluster was built using basic t2. micro nodes of Amazon EC2 and EBS. Each node is equipped with only 1 vCPU and 1 GB memory. The network performance is minimal for this cluster. A 4 node Spark cluster was built using general purpose m1.large nodes of Amazon EC2 and EBS. Each node is equipped with 2 vCPU and 7.5 GB memory. Network performance is moderate for this cluster. Both cluster configurations satisfy the minimum requirement to support replication factor of 3. We built a 64-bit Ubuntu AMI (Amazon Machine Instance) for each node-type before setting up the clusters. These AMIs were equipped with the latest distributions of Hadoop, Spark and GCC along with with our code base. The hadoop cluster had 5 nodes, where 1 node acted as the namenode, 1 node acted as the secondary name node and 3 nodes were acting as data nodes. The spark cluster had a master and 3 slave nodes. Since our proposed system works independently, all modules of the model had to be installed on every node of the EC2 clusters. A library of all modules in the model was implemented in C++ programming language using STL and multi-threading libraries and packaged together. Our code used TCP/IP protocol and SSH keys for communication between the nodes of the clusters.
Being able to detect the attack before the attacked program completes execution is a necessity for big data systems. Hence, we calculate the time overhead of the proposed system by conducting the experiments in real-time using popular examples and tests. We used two sets of open-source big data benchmark programs: (a) 16 Hadoop MapReduce Examples: that are provided in the Apache hadoop installation kit; and (b) 16 Spark-perf MLlib Tests: for machine learning algorithms given in the spark performance test suite by Databricks [45] . More details about these examples and tests are given in Table 1 .
The input to our model (built from the proposed system) is the run-time assembly code of a program. The hadoop MapReduce examples were coded in Java and the Sparkperf MLlib tests were coded in Scala. So, the jars to run these examples were built using just-in-time compiling. Their bytecodes are insufficient to create the assembly codes of the individual programs. We used a software called jitwatch [46] to generate the assembly codes (Intel x86 specification) of the programs from the jars. Since our algorithm only needs control-flow instructions from the generated assembly code outputs of each program, we used a custom parser that can filter out control flow instructions from the native files. All 32 example programs are infected by a Java code snippet that calls a function foo() to print Hello World! to the console and involves a total of 3 call instructions and 1 return instruction.
First, we calculated the execution times for the examples on the cluster. Then we studied the run times of the implemented model while it was analyzing the assembly codes of the driver programs of the same examples. These experiments are adhoc because the input arguments for some of the experiments were intentionally low to simulate worst case scenario's where the process takes very less time to execute. To meet the input data requirements of the MapReduce examples, we put the configuration file data from etc folder of hadoop into HDFS. The spark-perf MLlib tests on the spark cluster were conducted the same way the MapReduce examples were tested. Inputs for the tests were given in the config.py script.
Results and Analysis
The experiments we used for evaluating our proposed security system comprise of stress tests and performance benchmarks of hadoop and spark. Hence, knowing which threads of investigation to follow and which to ignore was difficult and challenging. We chose to focus on execution time and code size of the experiments. The overhead in our experiments is calculated from time measurements. We divide the time taken to detect an attack in a process p by the execution time of the same process and multiply the result by 100 to find the percentage of time overhead, as given in Equation (1) . Here time detect ðpÞ is calculated using system clock measurements for encrypting process analysis information, decrypting received messages and hash matching. The communication cost in sending data packets from one node to another is not included. The overhead calculations show the worst case scenario since the input arguments are intentionally low for some of the experiments. Real-world big data programs will be much more complex jobs and on the graph shown in Fig. 6a %overheadðpÞ ¼ time detect ðpÞ time execute ðpÞ Â 100:
The proposed system performs a similarity check of control flow within duplicate processes running on different nodes of a big data cluster. This control flow similarity check is performed by matching control instruction sequences. Attack detection for the sample attack was 100 percent. Since the infected node is predetermined in our experiments, our test cases do not have a false positive or false negative. But a false positive will occur when all data nodes are attacked in the same way. A false negative will occur in case of runtime attacks or attacks that originate outside the big data platform. But given our attack model, such cases are outside the scope of this work. Instead, we try to understand the control flow in the programs used in the experiments section, i.e., hadoop MapReduce examples and the spark performance tests for machine learning algorithms. Results from It can be inferred from these results that control flow instructions account for only one-fifth of the total instruction count for a program (assembly code). This is a remarkable coincidence among these two sets of programs because (a) they belong to different domains-MapReduce on hadoop, machine learning in spark; (b) their source programming language is different-java for hadoop Map-Reduce examples, scala for spark-perf machine learning tests; and (c) they differ in program size-86,000 instructions on average per program for the MapReduce example set and 180,000 instructions on average per program for the spark perf machine learning tests. This observation strengthens our initial argument that generating dynamic CFG for large and complex big data programs is cumbersome. This is because the size of CFG is proportional to the code lines which is related to the number of instructions. Hence, the proposed idea of generating CIS and hashing them is a good alternative to the CFG memory complexity problem. The overhead incurred in using the model built from the proposed system architecture is less than 3.28 percent if it is hosted by the same hardware that hosts the big data systems. This is in the acceptable range of overhead for big data platforms like Hadoop. The time our system takes to analyze the programs and compare the results is linearly dependent on the number of control flow instructions in the program, but not on the number of lines of assembly code. This greatly reduces the complexity of the similarity analysis from the conventional and complex approach of generating a CFG. Also, generating CIS only needs a one time parse through the program code (assembly code) and can be performed independently and in parallel on each node of the cluster. The experimental results show the feasibility of implementing a model of the proposed system. Building and implementing a detailed version of this system will demonstrate lower overhead and convince the vendors to adopt it. 
Limitations
Lack of open security benchmarks for big data applications and the vast scope of insider attacks prevented us form showing the attack detection capability of the proposed method. Hence, we used Hadoop's MapReduce examples and Spark's MLlib examples to show the efficiency of the proposed method with big data use cases. Our experiments only show the performance overhead on the underlying big data system when using the proposed technique (measured in time taken). Examples from Hadoop and Spark cover a wide range of applications which led to huge variance in our overhead measurements. Though the contribution of control flow instructions remains almost constant at 20 percent of program size, the variance in program size is significant and completely independent of execution time.
We did not theoretically prove the attack detection capability of the proposed approach. Also, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that deals with insider attacks in big data systems. Hence, experimental comparison of the proposed method with other related works proved to be impossible. To overcome these limitations, we introduced a sample attack in our experiments by adding a function foo() that prints Hello World! just before program termination. This was added to all programs on one datanode (as mentioned in the Setup). A sample of this is shown in using word count program on a 275 MB file in a Hadoop cluster. This sample program is written in Python and used Hadoop streaming service where the executable or script can be either sent to the datanodes or should already exist at the datanodes. We simulate the attack by adding the code block to the mapper script. Bytecode for the python script was obtained from the dis module that analyzes CPython bytecode and used as input for the proposed method. As mentioned in Results section, the attack was successfully detected. Fig. 7 shows code comparison of CPython bytecode on regular and compromised datanodes.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a security system for big data systems to detect insider attacks quickly with low overhead. The system consists of a two step attack detection algorithm and a secure communication protocol. A simple hash string matching technique is proposed to fulfill the distributed process similarity check and identify attacks. A secure communication protocol for data nodes that uses periodically generated random keys is proposed to conduct the detection algorithm. A model of the proposed system is tested in real-time on Amazon's EC2 clusters using a different sets of Hadoop and Spark programs. The time overhead was 3.28 percent and it is observed from the results that the proposed security system uses only 20 percent of program code to detect attacks. In this work, we also propose the idea of delegating security as an independent module and the components needed for such models are discussed. For future work, we would like to evaluate our system on security related big data benchmarks (when available). Also, we would like to actualize the hardware architecture of security chips that can independently support our system.
